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THE PROPRIETY OF DENYING ENTRY TO
HOMOSEXUAL ALIENS: EXAMINING THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE'S AUTHORITY
OVER MEDICAL EXCLUSIONS

From the early 1950's through the late 1970's, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) routinely denied homosexual aliens I admission to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 2 This provision requires the exclusion of aliens afflicted with "psychopathic personality" or, after
the 1965 Amendment,3 "sexual deviation." Both the INS and the Public
Health Service (PHS) participate in the exclusion process. 4 The INS
administers the general inspection procedure, 5 and the PHS performs
medical examinations. 6
In the last decade, however, health professionals have questioned
the status of homosexuality as a mental illness, and this change has
affected immigration policy. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed homosexuality from its list of mental diseases. 7
In 1979, the PHS responded to the reappraisal of homosexuality by

1. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 110l(a)(3) (1982).
.
2. 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(4) (1982).
3. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4)) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982)).
4. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1225(a) (1982).
5. "The inspection, other than physical and mental examination, of aliens ... seeking admission . . . shall be conducted by immigration officers . . . . " 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1982).
6. "The physical and mental examination of arriving aliens ... shall be made by medical
officers of the United States Public Health Service . . . . " 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982).
7. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1. In the first six printings of the AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-II], homosexuality, fetishism, pedophilia, transvestism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sadism, masochism, and other sexual deviations were included under the
heading "Sexual Deviations." Socarides, The Sexual Deviations and the Diagnostic Manual, 32
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 414, 418 (1978). Sexual deviations appear under the general headings of
"Personality Disorders" and "Certain Other Non-Psychotic Mental Disorders." Id. The seventh
printing of DSM-II (July 1974) substituted "sexual orientation disturbance (homosexuality)"
for homosexuality. Id. at 421. This new classification comprises persons troubled by their sexual .
interests in persons of the same sex, as distinguished from homosexuality per se, a form of sex-·
ual behavior not itself a psychiatric disorder. Id. See generally Ferlemann, Homosexuality, 5
MENNINGER PERSPECTIVE, Summer 1974, at 24; Hadden, Homosexuality: Its Questioned Classification, 6 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 165 (1976); Should Homosexuality Be in the APA Nomenclature?,
130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1207 (1973); Note, The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Exclusion of Homosexuals: Boutilier v. INS Revisited, 2 CARoozo L. REv. 359, 366-69 (1981).
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refusing to furnish the INS with the medical certification that, until
that time, had provided the basis for the exclusion of homosexual aliens. 8
In response to the PHS position, the INS, relying on its interpretation
of the INA, established a procedure by which it would exclude homosexual aliens even absent medical certification. 9
•
Courts differ on the validity of the INS practice of excluding aliens
without medical certification. In the context of a deportation proceeding,
the Ninth Circuit held, in Hill v. INS, 10 that medical certificatioa by
the PHS is an indispensable requirement for ·excluding an alien on
medical grounds. 11 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding in In re
Longstaff, 12 a naturalization case, that the INS has the authority to
exclude homosexual aliens despite the absence of a medical certificate. 13
This Note defends the position that the PHS has the authority to
define homosexuality for the purpose of the section 212(a)(4) exclusion, and that the PHS definition is binding upon the INS. Therefore,
the PHS's decision to refuse to examine aliens for homosexuality
precludes the INS from excluding aliens on that basis. Part I of this
Note traces the history of the policy of excluding homosexual aliens.
Part II maintains that, regardless of the psychiatric profession's interpretation of ''psychopathic personality,'' Congress intended the expression to encompass homosexuality. Part III contends that Congress intended to empower the PHS to change its policy concerning the exclusion of homosexual aliens. Part IV examines the effect of judicial
responses to the PHS's change in policy on the exclusion, deportation,
and naturalization of homosexual aliens, as well as the prospect of
congressional resolution of this controversy.
I.

HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSION OF HOMOSEXUAL ALIENS

Since the late nineteenth century, Congress has enacted a number
of statutes containing provisions that have excluded aliens afflicted with
mental disabilities from admission into the United States. 14 Congress
8. See Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for
Health, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to William Foege and
George Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979), reprinted in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 398-99 (1979) (hereinafter
cited as Memorandum of the Surgeon General]; see also id. at 387-88.
9. See Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, to David L.
Crosland, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Dec. 10, 1979), reprinted
in 56 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 572-81 (1979) [ht;reinafter cited as Memorandum of Attorney General];
Department of Justice Press Release (Sept. 9, 1980), reprinted in 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 441-42
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Press Release]; see also 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 440-41 (1980); 56
INTERPRETER RELEASES 569-71 (1979).
10. 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 1480.
12. 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861 (May 29, 1984).
13. Id. at 1448.
14. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551,
§ I, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898-99; Im-
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initially sought to stem the influx of aliens likely to become dependents
of the. states, 1 ' and consequently limited the purview of its first Act
to "lunatics" and "idiots." 16 Subsequent statutes,1 7 however, excluded
aliens on the basis of mental disability, without relating the disability
to the alien's capability of self-support. 18 In order to achieve this broader
objective, Congress expanded its formulation of mental disabilities by
including within it "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority." 19
Although no court ever determined that the expression ''constitutional
psychopathic inferiority" encompassed homosexuality, 20 this exp resmigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917); Immigration and Nationality
(McCarran-Walter) Act § 212(a)(l)-(5), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ l5(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(5) (1982)).
15. The Act of Aug. 3, 1882 specifically refers to lunatics and idiots who are "unable to
take care .of [themselves) without becoming ... public charge[s)," ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214,
and before Congress passed the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, "[t)he Ford committee reported that there
were thousands of alien paupers, insane persons, and idiots landing in this country annually
who became a burden upon the States .... " S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1950).
16. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214.
17. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 1917); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(a)(l)-(5), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. t. No. 89-236, § 15(b),
79 Stat. 911, 919 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(5) (1982)).
18. The 1917 Act added "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority" and "persons
with chronic alcoholism" to the list of mental disabilities set forth in earlier statutes. The Senate
report accompanying that bill expiained that the purpose of these additions and other changes
was to "prevent the introduction into the country of strains of mental defect that may continue
and multiply through succeeding generations, irrespective of the immediate effect .thereof on
earning capacity." S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1917), quoted in S. REP. No.
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1950).
19. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917).
20. A Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, In re La.Rochelle, 11 I. & N. Dec.
436 (BIA 1965), however, held that a homosexual came within the meaning of the term "constitutional psychopathic inferiority," but, in light of the alien's good standing, the BIA held
the deportation order in abeyance pending naturalization proceedings. The BIA based its inclusion of homosexual persons under the heading "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" on the
PHS regulations interpreting the expression. Although these regulations were not, in and of
themselves, conclusive, the BIA also maintained that replacement of the term "constitutional
psychopathic inferiority" with "psychopathic personality" in the 1952 Act represented Congress's
desire to continue excluding homosexual aliens. Looking to the legislative history of the 195~
Act, which explicitly expressed an intent to exclude homosexuals, see infra note 38 and accompanying text, the Board reasoned that since the later term did not to add to or modify the earlier
term, the two must be coextensive. Id. at 440-41. Still, prior to the. 1952 Act, the BIA only excluded aliens if they admitted to, or were convicted of, the commission of a homosexual act
that constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3,
39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917); see In re W-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 578 (BIA 1953) (deponation for admission
to crime of gross indecency, i.e., "male practicing masturbation with another male"); cf. In
re S-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 576 (BIA 1953) (insufficient information in the record to conclude that
conviction of the crime of gross indecency between males under a Michigan statute constituted
a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude); In re Z-_, 2 I. & N. Dec. 316 (BIA 1945)
(lack of a definition for the term "gross indecency," as used in the Canadian Criminal Code,
precluded the BIA from concluding that the crime of "gross indecency with another male person" constituted a crime involving moral turpitude). The BIA's use of the "crime of moral
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sion acted as the precursor of the terms "psychopathic personality" 21
and "sexual deviation, " 22 which immigration officials and courts have
employed to exclude homosexual aliens from admission. 23

A.

Legislative History of the Immigration and Nationality Act

In 1947, the Senate undertook a comprehensive investigation of the
immigration system. 24 This investigation culminated in the release of
a Judiciary Committee Report,2s which recommended the addition of
"homosexuals and other sex perverts" to the class of medically excludable aliens. 26 A bill incorporating these recommendations accompanied the report. 27
To aid its deliberation, Congress asked the Public Health Service
(PHS) to comment on the medical aspects of the proposed legislation. 28
The PHS responded, 29 but the meaning and implications of its response
remain unclear. Unlike.its analyses of the other medical classifications
set forth by the bill, 30 the PHS's comments on "homosexuals and sex
perverts" included no specific recommendation. Instead, the PHS addressed the difficulty encountered in substantiating the diagnosis of
homosexuality and sexual perversion, 31 and added that, in "instances
turpitude" clause rather than the "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" clause as a means
of denying admission to aliens who had apparently engaged in homosexual activity may indicate
that prior to the 1952 Act, homosexuality was not deemed a "constitutional psychopathic inferiority." See United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412-413 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion stating that the phrase "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" of the 1917 Act
did not clearly include homosexuals, but that the legislative history of the expression "psychopathic
personality" plainly indicates that homosexual persons were encompassed within that term).
21. . Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(4) (1982).
22. Id., as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 9ll, 919.
23. See Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. ll8 (1967); Quiroz
v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
24. S. Res. 137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 7879, 10,352 (1947).
25. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
26. Id. at 345 (the subcommittee recommended that "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" be replaced by "psychopathic personality" and the classes of mentally defectives enlarged
to include "homosexuals and other sex perverts").
27. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (introduced by Sen. McCarran).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 1653, 1699 [hereinafter cited as PHS REPORT).
29. Id. at 1699-1702.
30. The PHS recommended that Congress: (l) eliminate the term "feeble-minded" from the
expression "idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded ... , " (2) drop "loathsome disease" from the provision which includes "dangerous contagious disease," (3) regroup the categories so that "narcotic drug addicts" will appear among the other classes subject ·10 medical determination, and
so that "aliens who are paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants" would not, and (4) retain the
expressions "epileptics," "psychopathic personality," "mental defects," and "tuberculosis." Id.
31. Id. at 1701 (PHS noting that although some psychological tests may help uncover homosexuality of which the individual himself is unaware, there are no reliable laboratory tests for diagnosing
homosexuality, and an individual may therefore successfully conceal a history of homosexuality).
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where the disturbance in sexuality [might] be difficult to uncover, a
more obvious disturbance in personality [might] be encountered which
would warrant a classification of psychopathic personality or mental
defect. " 32
The Senate Judiciary Committee reformulated the immigration bill 33
to reflect both the PHS report and testimony presented in joint
hearings. 34 This new bill 35 eliminated "homosexuals and sex perverts"
as an exclusionary category. The report 36 accompanying the bill maintained that the Senate made this change in response to the PHS assertion that ''the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with
psychopathic personality or a mental defect ... [was] sufficiently broad
to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts." 37 The
report further specified that the "change in nomenclature [was] not
to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens
who are sexual deviates. " 38 The revised bill passed Congress to become
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 39

B.

Judicial Interpretation of the INA

The first significant issue• 0 to arise from the application of section
212(a)(4) 41 of the INA concerned whether the expression "psychopathic
personality" included "homosexuality." Initially there was little doubt
that it did. Following a number of administrative decisions,• 2 the Sec32. Id.
33. The original bill, S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), had been introduced by Sen. McCarran. This bill was reintroduced in the next session without significant modification. S. 716, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). Rep. Walter submitted a similar bill to the House, H.R. 2379, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951), while Rep. Cellar introduced a competing bill which, among other differences,
did not include "persons afflicted with psychopathic personality," "homosexuals," or "sex
perverts" as classes of excludable aliens. H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
34. Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws: Joint Hearings on S.
716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 784 (1951).
35. S. 2550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
36. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id.
39. H.R. 5678, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), which was introduced by Rep. Walter, passed Congress on June 27, 1952 to become the Immigration and Naturalization (McCarran-Walter) Act,
ch. 2, 66 Stat. 166 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (1976)). The final wording of the
relevant subsection, § 212(a)(4) of the INA, provided for the exclusion of "(a]liens afflicted
with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect."
40. The second important issue, which concerns what institution should have the authority
to define homosexuality, provides the focus for Part III of this Note. The issue becomes significant only when it has been established that homosexuality is included within "psychopathic personality." This task is undertaken in Part II of the Note.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982).
42. In re P-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 258 (BIA 1956); In re S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1959).
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ond Circuit in Quiroz v. Neel/y 43 looked to the legislative history of
the Act and concluded that, regardless of the medical profession's
understanding of the term "psychQpathic personality," Congress intended it to include homosexuality. 44
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,4' however, the Ninth Circuit disrupted this
consensus. 46 F/euti involved the deportation 47 of an allegedly homosexual
alien under section 241(a)(l) of the INA, 48 a provision requiring the
deportation of any alien who, though excludable at the time of entry,
had somehow gained admission. The Ninth Circuit objected to the use
of postentry behavior in determining the excludability of an alien, 49
and maintained that evidence of homosexual activity subsequent to entry
was irrelevant to the decision of whether immigration officials should
have admitted an alien in the first place. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's determination that, in the context of postentry behavior, the expression "psychopathic personality" was void for vagueness' 0 led some

43.
44.

291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
We find it unnecessary "to embark" . . . "on an amateur's voyage on the fogenshrouded sea of psychiatry." . . . The legislative history is clear as to the meaning
to be given to ["psychopathic personality"] .... Whatever the phrase ... may mean
to the psychiatrist, to Congress it was.intended to include homosexuals and sex perverts.
It is that intent which controls here.
Id. at 907.
4S. 302 F.2d 6S2 (9th Cir. 1962), vacafeaand remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S.449 (1963).
46. In addition to the authorities mentioned in notes 42 and 43, supra, other courts have
interpreted§ 212(a)(4) without directly applying it to exclude or deport a hoinosexual alien. See,
e.g., United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412-13 (2d Cir. 19S6) (Frank, J., concurring) (stating that the legislative history of the expression "psychopathic personality" plainly
indicates that homosexual persons were encompassed within that term); Ganduxe y Marino v.
Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (where alien convicted of solicitation of another
male denied ever having been arrested or convicted, the court deemed the misrepresentation material
since, had this information been known earlier, "an attempt would almost certainly have been
made to exclude him" as a homosexual person under § 212(a)(4) of the INA), aff'd sub nom.
Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960).
47. Although § 212(a)(4) of the INA explicitly pertains to. the excludability of aliens, most
cases under that section involve deportation proceedings. The reason for this lies in the differing
due process requirements for exclusion and deportation. These requirements facilitate more readily
appeals on substantive matters for deportations. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 18S,
187 (19S8); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (19S3). See generally
Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1286, 1311-33 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments); Note, Constitutional Limits on the
Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 9S7 (1982); Note, Limitations on Congressional
Power to Deport Resident Aliens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 YALE L.J.
931 (19S9).
An excluded alien who has exhausted his administrative remedies may obtain judicial review
of an exclusion order only by habeas corpus proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § llOS(b) (1982). See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. S69, 57S (N.D. Cal. 1982), modified
sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 12Sl(a)(l) (1982).
49. 302 F.2d at 6S5.
50. 302 F.2d at 654-S8.
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courts to misunderstand the case, and at least one court interpreted
Fleuti to mean that homosexual aliens could not be excluded as "persons afflicted with psychopathic personality.'' 51
In Boutilier v. INS, 52 the Supreme Court eliminated the confusion
surrounding the validity of using the expression ''psychopathic personality" to exclude homosexual aliens. The Court held that Congress
intended the expression ''psychopathic personality'' to include
homosexuality 53 and, furthermore, that the phrase is not used as a
clinical term, but as an expression designed to achieve Congress's goal
of excluding homosexual aliens. 54 The Court also rejected the voidfor-vagueness argument, asserting that, with regard to preentry 55
51. Lavoie v. INS, 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), vacated and remanded per curiam,
387 U.S. 572 (1967), on remand, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1970). The Lavoie court included none
of the judges who handed down the 1962 Fleuti decision. The court issued a per curiam decision
which, without revealing any of the cases's facts, maintained that Fleuti stood for the proposition that the term "psychopathic personality" is void for vagueness as applied to homosexuals.
The actual facts of Lavoie reveal that, unlike in Fleuti, the court based its decision to deport
Lavoie exclusively on evidence of preentry behavior. In re Lavoie, 121. & N. DEC. 821 (BIA 1968).
Congress also seems to have read Fleuti too broadly. Its 1965 amendment of 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(4)
was a response to its determination that Fleuti had held section 212(a)(4) to be "unconstitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed within the term 'psychopathic
personality.'" S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st_ Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CooE CoNG. &
Ao. NEWS 3328, 3337.
52. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). Justice Brennan dissented for the same reasons Judge Moore did
in the lower court opinion. Justices Douglas and Fortas dissented because they found "psychopathic
personality" too vague a term to be employed as a criterion for imposition of penalities or punishment and that "affliction" conveyed the idea of an accustomed pattern of conduct, or a way
of life, which had not been demonstrated in this case. Id. at 125-35.
53. The court relied on legislative history, especially S. REP. No. 1137, see supra text accompanying note 38, in finding that "the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals .... " 387 U.S. at 120.
· Justice Brennan dissented for the same reasons that Judge Moore dissented from the lower
court opinion. Judge Moore's interpretation of congressional intent, which is probably closer
to the sentiments expressed in the PHS comments on the proposed bill, see infra text accompanying notes 80-85, contends that Congress could not have intended to exclude all homosexual
persons, but only those who have a "long-lasting and perhaps compulsive orientation towards
homosexual or otherwise 'abnormal' behavior.'' 363 F.2d at 488. This distinction goes to the
parameters of Congress's definition of homosexuality, rather than to the more general question
of whether "psychopathic personality" represents a medical term or a term of art. Judge Moore
does not deny that Congress intended to exclude certain homosexual aliens under § 212(a)(4)
of the INA, but only insofar as these homosexual aliens are afflicted with psychopathic personality, id. at 498; he contests the validity of the PHS decision that this particular homosexual
alien suffered from "psychopathic personality.''
54. Because of the manner in which Congress expressed its reasons for adopting the expression "psychopathic personality," the Court concluded that the term was not used in its medical
sense. 387 U.S. at 121-22. The Court based this conclusion on Congress's arguably erroneous
assertion that it was adopting a PHS recommendation. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89.
The lower court refers to the expression "psychopathic personality" as a term of art, 363 F.2d
at 493-94, and relies on the same reasoning as Quiroz, see supra note 44.
55. Boutilier, unlike Fleuti, involved a deportation based on evidence of exclusively preentry
behavior. 387 U.S. at 123-24.
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behavior, Congress's plenary power to make rules for the admission
of aliens was not subject to any constitutional requirement of fair
warning. 56
C.

1965 Amendment

In 1965, Congress substantially revised immigration policy. 57 One
change made was the addition of the term "sexual deviation" to section 212(a)(4) of the INA in response to its understanding of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Fleuti. 58 The report accompanying this legislation
first reiterated the Judiciary Committee's 1952 position that the "change
in nomenclature'' resulting from the elimination of homosexuality and
sexual perversion as explicit exclusionary categories was "not to be
construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who
are sexual deviates. " 59 The report then explained that the committee
specifically had added the medical 60 term "sexual deviation" as a ground
of exclusion to resolve any remaining doubt. 61
56. Id. at 123.
Justices Douglas and Fortas dissented on the ground that the term "psychopathic personality"
was too vague to be used as a standard for the imposition of deportation. Id. at 125-35.
Judge Moore's dissent, on which Justice Brennan based his dissent, argued that had the exclusionary expression been less vague, the alien could have modified his preentry behavior. Consequently, he agreed with the decision in Lavoie, see supra note 51, 363 F.2d at 498-99.
57. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)).
58. See supra note 51.
59. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951), quoted in S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3328, 3337. "In view of the representations made by the U.S. Public Health Service that the term 'psychopathic personality' would
encompass homosexuals and sex perverts, the Congress in enacting the [INA] omitted from the
law any specific provision relating to the ineligibility of such persons." S. REP. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 3337.
60. A number of congressional representatives indicated in debate on the floor of the House
that "sexual deviation" represents a medical term. Rep. Feighan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting the
bill stated that it "establishes a new class of aliens who are mandatorily excluded from admission. Those are persons classified under the medical term of 'sexual deviation.'" 111 CONG.
REc. 21,586 (1965). Rep. Gilbert commented that "[t]he measure . . . retains the exclusionary
provisions of its predecessors, designed to assure that the United States does not become burdened
with persons who are physically or morally unfit. Though this objective remains unchanged,
several of the old definitions of unfitness have been refined to conform with"•new medical or
psychological knowledge.'' Ill CONG. REc. 21,771 (1965). Rep. Poff stated that, by using the
precise term "sexual deviation," "the bill makes it plain that the Congress intends that aliens
afflicted with that disgraceful disability be excluded from our shores.'' Ill CoNG. REc. 21,782
(1965). Finally, Rep. Ryan noted that "certain mental and physical conditions warranting excludability under the old law have been clarified and made to conform with recent advances
in medical science.'' Ill CoNG. REc. 21,782 (1965).
61. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 3328, 3337. The amended version of§ 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982),
provides for the exclusion of "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, sexual deviation,
or a mental defect."
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LEGAL RELATIONSIIlP BETWEEN HOMOSEXUALITY AND
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY

The examination of two issues may prove helpful in analyzing the
dispute that has arisen from the refusal of the PHS to certify aliens
who are homosexual as medically excludable. The first issue involves
whether homosexuality constitutes a form of "psychopathic personality." This was the primary concern of pre-Boutilier decisions and is
roughly equivalent to asking whether Boutilier was correctly decided.
The second issue assumes, for reasons which will be developed in this
section, that ·Boutilier was correctly decided, and then seeks to determine the proper meaning of homosexuality under section 212(a)(4) of
the INA. This two-part analysis establishes that the Boutilier Court's
characterization of "psychopathic personality" as a term of art arises
from circumstances and concerns that do not apply to ''homosexuality" or "sexual deviation." Consequently, the Court's holding that
"psychopathic personality" does not lend itself to medical reevaluation should not preclude the PHS from interpreting "homosexuality"·
and "sexual deviation" in light of congressional intent and advancing
medical knowledge.
Prior to Boutilier, two views existed with regard to the meaning of
"psychopathic personality." The first, to which the Boutilier dissenters
subscribed, argued that Congress used the expression as a medical term 62
and that homosexuals should be excluded only insofar as they are afflicted with the mental condition "psychopathic personality." 63 The
other view, which ultimately prevailed, asserted that "psychopathic personality'' represents a term of art 64 that Congress employed to_ exclude
certain classes of aliens, with one such class comprising aliens who
are homosexual. 65 An examination of the meaning of the term
"psychopathic personality" in the context of the statute as a whole
provides the appropriate point of departure in determining the relative
merits of each _of these opposing arguments. 66

62. This is never stated explicitly, but Judge Moore urges that a physical examination is required to establish that the petitioner is a psychopathic personality, even if it has already been
determined that he is homosexual. 363 F.2d at 496-99. Similarly, Justice Douglas discusses various
medical definitions of "psychopathic personality" in his dissenting opinion. 387 U.S. at 125-131.
63. 363 F.2d at 497-98.
64. See Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961).
65. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. ll8, 120, 122 (1966).
66. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S.
707, 713 (1975); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 385 (1805). See generally 2A
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.05 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973 & Supp.
1982).
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Statutory Language

The position of "psychopathic personality" within the statute indicates that the term has medical significance. First, section 212(a)(4), 67
which contains the term, is located among six other medically related
subsections. 68 Second, section 234 69 requires the provision of suitable
facilities for examining aliens suspected of being excludable under the
first five of these subsections. 10 Third, section 23411 authorizes the
Surgeon General to promulgate additional regulations to govern these
medical examinations. Finally, if a medical officer issues a certificate
excluding an alien under one of these provisions, section 236(d) 12 dictates that the INS must base its decision to exclude solely upon that
certificate.
These factors do not, however, dispositively determine that
"psychopathic personality" constitutes a medical term. The statute provides the same medical procedures for aliens suspected of being
"insane" 73 as for aliens suspected of being afflicted with "psychopathic
personality," even though insanity is a legal and not a medical term. 74
Because the statute fails to clarify the meaning of ''psychopathic personality," it is necessary to examine the INA's history to determine
the purpose Congress intended the term to serve. 75
67.
68.

8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(4) (1982).
§ 1182. Excludable aliens

(a) General classes
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
(1) Aliens who are mentally retarded;
(2) Aliens who a~e insane;
(3) Aliens who have had one or more attacks of insanity;
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental
defect;
(5) Aliens who are narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics;
'(6) Aliens who are afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease;
(7) Aliens not comprehended within any of the foregoing classes who are certified
by the examining physician as having a physical defect, disease, or disability, when
determined by the consular or immigration officer to be of such a nature that it may
affect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes
that he will not· have to earn a living; . . ..
8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(7) (1982). Section ll82(a)(8), which excludes aliens "who are paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants," however, is not a medical exclusion.
69. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982).
70. 8 U .S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(5) (1982).
71. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982).
73. 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(2) (1982).
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 714 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) ("INSANITY. The term is a social
aqd legal term rather than a medical one.").
75. One may make a distinction between legislative intent and statutory meaning. The former
looks at the language of the statute from the point of view of the drafter, the latter views it
from the perspective of those persons whom the legislation will affect. J. SUTHERLAND, supra
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Congressional Intent

The first version of the proposed INA, introduced in 1950, contained
a provision specifically requiring the exclusion of homosexual aliens. 76
In a subsequent draft, 11 the House Judiciary Committee removed this
provision. Although the Committee allegedly removed the provision
in respons~ to the recommendations of a PHS report, 78 a close examination of the report suggests otherwise. Discrepancies exist between
the PHS position and Congress's interpretation of that position, and
these discrepancies laid the groundwork for the present controversy.
1. PHS report- The predominant PHS concern was diagnosability. 79
Its report indicated that the lack of a reliable laboratory test makes
substantiating a diagnosis of homosexuality difficult. 80 The report noted,
however, that more obvious disturbances would come under the
classifications "psychopathic personality" or "mental defect" found
in another provision of the proposed statute. 81 Nevertheless, despite
these comments, it failed to make specific recommendations regarding
the retention of homosexuality as an explicit exclusionary classification. 82
The PHS never stated that psychopathic personality, as understood
note 66, § 45.03. Congress has plenary power with regard to the exclusion of aliens. See Boutilier
v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 609 (1889). Aliens applying for admission are entitled to procedural, but not substantive
due process in exclusionary hearings. See supra note 47. It therefore seems reasonable to focus
on Congress's intent rather than the effect of the statute on· incoming aliens. J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 66, § 45.08. This eliminates the option of employing canons of construction which
regard a term's common meaning as providing a definition preferable to the technical or legal
meaning. Id. § 47 .27-47 .30, at 137-52. This analysis also can be used to resolve the void-forvagueness controversy: if the sole concern is what the legislature meant by the term, then there
is no reason to examine whether the alien finds it vague.
76. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
77. S. 2055, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
78. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951); see supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
79. The diagnosability of homosexuality is a recurring issue. In 1979 the PHS said that homosexuality is not medically diagnosable. Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 399 .
. The possible meanings of this statement will be discussed later. See infra note 151. The difficulty
does not seem to involve determining, after prolonged analysis, whether an individual is homosexual.
Rather, the problem consists of developing an accurate, expedient, standardized test for making
this determination. See, e.g., DeLuca, Performance of Overt Male Homosexuals and Controls
on Blocky Test, 23 J. CuN1cAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (1967) (concluding that the Blacky Test does
not differentiate overt male homosexuals from nonhomosexuals); Goldfried, On the Diagnosis
of Homosexuality from the Rorschach, 30 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 338 (1966) (concluding
that the Rorschach test is of limited efficacy); Zamansky, A Technique for Assessing Homosexual Tendencies, 24 J. PERSONALITY 436 (1956) (concluding that overt homosexuals (I} will look
at a picture of a man relatively longer than will a normal male; (2) will manifest, when compared
to normal males, a greater attraction to men than to neutral objects; and, (3) subject to limitations, will manifest a greater avoidance of women than will normal males); see also D. WEST,
HOMOSEXUALITY 48-53 (3d ed. 1968).
80. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701.
81. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
82. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1700.
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by the medical profession, encompassed homosexuality. Instead, the
PHS noted that persons with sociopathic reactions are afflicted with
psychopathic personality, and that this group frequently includes individuals suffering from sexual deviation. 83 Elsewhere in the report the
PHS stated that ordinarily persons with pathologic behavior such as
"homosexuality or sexual perversion which includes sexual sadism,
fetishism, tranvestism and pedophelia" are included within the classification "psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality. " 84 The
modifiers "frequently" in the first statement and "ordinarily" in the
second imply that not all homosexuals would necessarily come under
the term "psychopathic personality." When examined in conjunction
with the difficulty involved in diagnosing homosexuality,8 5 the PHS
report seems to suggest that the INA should not exclude homosexual
aliens who exhibit no evidence of "psychopathic personality," "mental defect," or "pathologic sexuality."
2. Congressional interpretation- A Senate Judiciary Committee
report 86 noted that the provision excluding aliens afflicted with
"psychopathic personality" did not specifically provide for the exclusion of homosexual aliens. 87 Nevertheless, the report maintained that
the change in nomenclature did not modify th·e intent to exclude sex-

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1701. The ambiguity of this statement casts even greater doubt on the extent to
which "psychopathic personality" encompasses "homosexuality." It is unclear whether homosexuality and/or sexual perversion absent sexual sadism, fetishism, transvestism or pedophilia would
constitute "pathologic sexuality" for purposes of determining "psychopathic personality."
85. See supra note 79. The mental examination of an alien consists of an interview by an
aide who is alert for any unusual sign indicating mental aberration. HousE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., )ST SESS., SPECIAL SERIES No. 12, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS, INQUIRY INTO THE ALIEN MEDICAL EXAMINATION PROGRAM OF THE U.S. PUBUC
HEALTH SERVICE 28 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PHS STUDY).
86. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The authority of this report is discounted
in Note, "Psychopathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation": Medical Terms or Legal CatchAlls-Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Aliens, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 328, 337-39 (1967). The
author argues that the official legislative history of the Act is H. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1952), since it was the House bill, not the Senate bill, which became law. Id. at 338. The
House Report states that the medical grounds of exclusion "have been reexamined in the light
of information made available by the [PHS)." H. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1693. The Note suggests that the House, therefore,
intended to incorporate the PHS position that only sexually deviant persons with a more obvious
mental disturbance (e.g., psychopathic personality) were to be excluded. Note, supra, at 339.
It is further observed, however, that the House bill eliminated the explicit exclusion of "aliens
who are homosexuals or sex perverts," although the PHS Report makes no such recommendation. Id. This inconsistency seems to fndicate that views of the House were tantamount to those
of the PHS. Since the inquiry seeks to determine what Congress meant, it may be preferable
to examine the Senate Report.
87. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); accord H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1965) (official legislative history of the 1965 Amendments, citing the 1952 Senate
Report); s. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3328, 3337.
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ually deviant aliens, stating that the PHS had advised the committee
that the terms "psychopathic personality" and "mental defect" were
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of ho111osexuals and "sex
perverts. " 88 Actually, the PHS had asserted that in "instances where
the disturbance in sexuality may be difficult to uncover, a more obvious disturbance in personality may be encountered which would warrant a classification of psychopathic personality or mental defect. " 89
This discrepency provides the peculiar circumstances that provoked the
Supreme Court to determine that, in the context of the statute,
"psychopathic personality" represents a legal term.

C.

Meaning of Boutilier

Boutilier does not controvert the general authority of the PHS to
interpret medical terms to reflect advances in medical knowledge. 90 The
Supreme Court read the Senate Report 91 as an expression of Congress's
desire to exclude homosexual aliens. 92 The Court saw no reason to question the report's assertion that the PHS had indicated that "psychopathic
personality" encompassed "homosexuality," especially in light of the
PHS having certified Boutilier as excludable. 93 Its concern over the
psychiatric profession's decision to classify "homosexuality" under a
heading other than "psychopathic personality" 94 prompted the Court
88. See supra note 87.
89. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701. The Senate may have looked at the PHS statement
that "[o]rdinarily, persons suffering from disturbances in sexuality are included within the classification of 'psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.'" Id. The word "ordinarily" fails,
however, to establish whether homosexual persons will always fall within the classification.
Moreover, it is not clear that the general classification "psychopathic personality" encompasses
the classification "psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.'' See supra note 84.
90. Boutilier may, in fact, more strongly support the contention that the Supreme Court
intended to emphasize the PHS's authority. The PHS guidelines themselves stated that
"psychopathic personality" represents a legal term. Pulluc HEAI.ra SERVICE, MANuAL FOR MEDICAL
EXAMINATION OF ALmNS § 6-1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PHS MANuAL]. Furthermore, the Court
mentions three times that Congress based its decision on PHS findings and twice that PHS doctors made the determination of Boutilier's homosexuality. 387 U.S. at 122.
91. Although the Senate Report may not be the official legislative history of the Act, it
represents the most explicit, most consistent expression of congressional intent available. See
supra note 86. As such, it is arguably the strongest foundation on which the Boutilier Court
could have rested its decision. It is interesting to note that neither the Boutilier Court nor the
petitioners in their brief directly question this report's authority. The citation of the Senate Report
in the official legislative history of the 1965 amendment, H. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
16 (1965), further weakens the argument against reliance on the report.
92. 387 U.S. at 120-22.
93. Id. at 122.
94. 363 F.2d at 493 n.9, 494 n.11; cf, Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541
F.Supp. 569, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1982), modified sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Boutilier authority is not controlling where the medical profession has not changed the
medical illness label applied to a homosexual ... , but rather has determined that homosexuality
is no longer a medical illness, mental disorder, or a sexual deviation at all.'').
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to affirm both congressional intent and PHS policy by fixing the legal
relationship between these two terms. As such, the decision merely
represents the repair of a congressional misinterpretation of medical
terminology - a misinterpretation the PHS supported out of deference
to congressional intent.
Ill.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHS POLICY CHANGE

Congress and the Supreme Court have adopted the position that
homosexuality is included within "psychopathic personality" and/ or
"sexual deviation." In order to apply the term "homosexuality" to
individual aliens, it remains necessary to determine precisely what Congress meant by this term. The statute itself provides no definition of
"psychopathic personality" or "sexual deviation," much less "homosexuality.'' Because a number of definitions of homosexuality exist, 9 s one
must examine the purpose of Congress's exclusion of homosexual aliens
in order to ascertain the appropriate meaning.

A. Medical Nature of the Exclusion
Although the placement of section 212(a)(4) among a group of medical
exclusions may create a presumption that the provision's purpose was
the exclusion of mentally disabled aliens, Congress may have employed
medical terms to achieve nonmedical objectives. It has been asserted
that "homosexuality" serves as a term of convenience employed to
exclude immoral aliens, 96 subversive aliens,9 7 or aliens likely to become
public charges.
Although such conjecture is plausible, little evidence suggests that
95. Homosexuality can be unconscious, pseudo, latent, compulsive or debilitive. S. Wn.us,
UNDERSTANDING AND COUNSELING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL 25-39 (1967). A broad definition of
homosexuality could include at least 370Jo of the American population, A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY
& C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948), while the more restrictive
definition of sexual orientation disturbance, see DSM-II, supra note 7, probably would encompass a much smaller fraction of the.population. See also D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED,
1-2 (1977); D. WEST, supra note 79, at 10-15.
96. In 1950, the year the first version of the INA was introduced in Congress, the Senate
passed a resolution authorizing a study and investigation of the federal government's employment of persons described as "homosexuals and other moral perverts," and of the preparedness
of the government for the protection of life and property against the threat to security inherent
in the employment of such perverts. S. Res. 280, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REc. 8209
(1950). See Developments, supra note 47, at 1342-48 (implying that the legal nature of the term
"psychopathic personality" created a per se bar against admitting homosexuals and relying on
comments made in the 1965 floor debates as evidence that Congress did not exclude homosexual
aliens solely for medical purposes); see also supra note 60.
97. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 16 (Rep. Poff) (asserting that the importance of excluding
homosexual aliens lies not in the immorality involved, but in the susceptibility of homosexuals
to subversion). The Senate undertook a study of homosexuals and sex perverts as federal employees
and found them unsuitable and a security risk. See 96 CONG. REC. 16,587 (1950) (presenting
S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)); see also D. WEST, supra note 79, at 92-93.
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this was Congress's purpose. Substantial evidence, however, supports
the proposition that the exclusion of homosexual aliens sought to protect exclusively medical interests. Although Congress may have considered homosexuality morally reprehensible, it failed to reveal such
a view when it enacted the INA. Each draft of the statute contained
a group of provisions explicitly denying admission to certain classes
of immoral aliens, 98 yet in each of these bills, Congress placed the clause
excluding homosexual aliens among the medical, not moral, exclusions.
Moreover, the replacement of the terms ''homosexuality'' and ''sexual perversion" with the expression "psychopathic personality" fails
to evince an intent to exclude homosexual aliens for moral reasons.
If Congress had truly believed that the exclusion of homosexual aliens
served a moral purpose, its objective might have been furthered by
retaining the term "homosexuality," with all its moral overtones, rather
than by acceding to a PHS medical report and relying instead on
"psychopathic personality," a: less morally charged term.
Congress also failed to disclose a morally oriented objective in its
1965 amendment of the INA. The Fleuti decision, which had prompted
Congress to reassess its use of "psychopathic ·personality" in section
212(a)(4), addressed a controversy ultimately based upon conflicting
medical interpretations of that expression. 99 Again, Congress could have
resolved this dispute by making clear that homosexuality was a mor_al
category of exclusion. This could have been accomplished by including
homosexuality among the other moral exclusions, or at least by announcing that it used medical terms to achieve a moral end. Instead,
Congress merely added "sexual deviation," a more precise medical term
than "psychopathic personality," to section 212(a)(4). 100
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (19821 provides for the exclusion of aliens involved in certain acts deemed
immoral. See, e.g., § l 182(a)(9) (crimes involving moral turpitude); § l 182(a)(l0) (habitual
criminals); § l 182(a)(l l) (polygamists);§ l 182(a)(l2) (prostitutes); § 1182(a)(l3) (immoral sex acts).
99. Dr. Dahlgren, a PHS physician, and Dr. Harvey, who represented Fleuti, disagreed as
to the propriety of classifying Fleuti as a psychopathic personality. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302
F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
100. The remarks of two congressmen on the House floor provide the strongest evidence
of a nonmedical purpose behind Congress's exclusion of homosexual aliens. Rep. Gilbert stated
that the 1965 Amendment would assure the exclusion of physically or morally unfit persons. 111
CoNo. REc. 21,771 (1965). Since the only changes affecting § 212(a) were (1) the replacement
of "feebleminded" with "mentally retarded," (2) the deletion of "epilepsy," (3) the addition of
"sexual deviation," and (4) an alteration of the exclusion of aliens with communicable diseases
and past mental illness, 79 Stat. at 919, one can infer that moral unfitness applied to sexual deviation.
Rep. Poff referred to sexual deviation as a disgraceful affliction. 111 CoNo. REc. 21,772 (1965).
It is interesting to note, however, that the 1917 Act excluded aliens afflicted with "loathsome"
contagious diseases, and that the first version of the INA also used that term. It seems unlikely
that the use of this pejorative modifier was intended to alter the medical nature of that exclusion.
The statements of these two congressmen, especially Rep. Gilbert's explicit reference to moral
unfitness, must be accorded some probative weight, but they are by no means dispositive evidence
of congressional purpose. Generally, statements made during floor debates are inadmissable in
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When it passed the INA, Congress's concerns included the exclusion of aliens likely to engage in subversive activities. 101 Although some
evidence suggests that Congress believed homosexual persons presented
a greater security risk than heterosexual persons, 102 there is no evidence
suggesting that this concern prompted Congress to exclude homosexual aliens. In fact, Congress explicitly provided for the exclusion of
potential subversives in comprehensive provisions elsewhere in the
statute. 103
Similarly, although the entry of aliens afflicted with mental disorders
that render them unable to earn a living had also· been a longstanding
concern of Congress, 104 nothing indicates that the exclusion of aliens
afflicted with "psychopathic personality" was designed to eliminate
construing a statute, but remarks made by a committee member are given some weight. United
States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (where doubt exists as to the meaning
of a statute, informed congressional discussion should not be disregarded.); United States v.
St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918). Both Reps. Poff and Gilbert were members
of the House Judiciary Committee which reported the bill, and Rep. Gilbert served on the Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality as well. The importance of such statements is greater
in instances like this, where they concern the history at the time of enactment, the purpose of
the bill, or the evil to be remedied rather than the meaning of the language itself. Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935); Standard Oil Co. v. United States; 221
U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
Nevertheless, these are isolated comments that may represent no more than personal opinion.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (debates in Congress expressive
of the views of individual members should not be resorted to in determining congressional meaning and purpose). The testimony before the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee which
provoked the addition of the expression "sexual deviation" bore no indications of a moral purpose, Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-52 (1965), nor did the original Act which Congress
intended to clarify with this amendment.
The Supreme Court maintains that an "isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in
meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish [an] affirmative congressional
expression." Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982). Even a remark by a sponsor of legislation, although accorded substantial weight, Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976), is not controlling in analyzing legislative history. Weinberger, 456 U.S.
at 35 n.15; see also Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,311 (1979). Thus, the isolated comments of Reps.
Poff and Gilbert, ambiguous in light of these representatives' acknowledgement of the amendment's medical nature, see supra note 60, do not merit recognition as expressions of congressional
intent.
101. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 and Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 were
designed to combat sedition and subversion. H. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1653, 1673-74. The INA was intended to provide a
more thorough screening of aliens likely to be security risks or subversives. Id. at 1679.
102. The interim report from an investigation of homosexual persons in government concluded that overt homosexuals and other sex perverts should not be tolerated in government
service because they are generally unsuitable and, futhermore, constitute security risks. 96 CONG.
REc. 16,587 (1950) (presenting S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)); see also supra note 97.
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)-(29) (1982).
104. As early as 1882 Congress enacted a law excluding aliens likely to become public charges.
Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. Such provisions have continued to the
present. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (1982).

WINTER

Homosexual Aliens

1984)

347

this problem. Indeed, another section of the statute explicitly addresses
this concern. 105
The purpose of the ''psychopathic personality'' exclusion was to
"keep out 'tainted blood,' that is, 'persons who have medical traits
that would harm the people of the United States if these traits were
introduced in this country.' " 106 This statement does not clarify the exact nature of the harm anticipated, but such medical harm seems to
bear little relation to the problem of aliens becoming public charges. 10 '
Thus, though questions of morality, subversion, or destitution may
have motivated Congress to act, 108 the evidence of such intentions is
inadequate to override the manifestly medical nature of the provision.
B.

PHS Role in the Exclusion of Aliens

Another area of contention in determining the excludability of
homosexual aliens is the requirement of section 236(d) that, if a medical
officer has certified an alien excludable, then the decision to exclude
shall be based solely upon that certification. 109 The Ninth Circuit maintains that a medical certificate constitutes an indispensable_prerequisite
to exclusion, 110 while the Fifth Circuit contends that an applicant's admission of homosexuality suffices to establish excludability. 111 Neither
assertion entirely corresponds with Congress's statutory scheme, and
both avoid the pivotal question of the PHS authority in the exclusionary process. The great weight of evidence suggests, however, that
the exclusion of aliens on medical grounds does not necessarily _demand a medical certificate, but that no alien can be excluded in disregard
of PHS policy.
·
105. "Aliens . . . who are certified . . . as having a physical defect, disease, or disability
... of such a nature that it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living [shall be excluded
from admission) unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not have to earn a living."
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (1982).
106. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1950) (emphasis added). The Immigration
Service espouses this purpose. The Committee on the Judiciary added that the classification "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" (later to become "psychopathic personality''.) was designed
to prevent the entry of aliens with "an inherent likelihood of becoming mental cases." Id.
107. Congress allowed an exception to the exclusion in § 1182(a)(7) for aliens who would
not hav.e to support themselves. The absence of such an exception in § I 182(a)(4) indicates that
the purpose of excluding aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality goes beyond a concern
that the alien not become a public charge.
108. One commentator looks to a remark by one congressman in floor debates to conclude
that the implicit assumption made in Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day (the district court decision in
Hill v. INS) and Boutilier, that the psychopathic personality exclusion is a medical one, is flaw~d.
See Developments, supra note 47, at 1346. The possibility that Congress had ulterior motives
for enacting a statute, however, would not seem to control that statute's construction when the
actual words, context, and legislative history of the law fail to confirm those motives.
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982).
110. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983).
Ill. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861
(May 29, 1984).
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1. Necessity of medical certification- The wording of section 236(d)
requires the exclusion of aliens under section 212(a)(l)-(7) 112 to rest upon
medical certification when such certification is available. 113 Because of
the prior availability of medical certificates, the issue of exclusion
without certification had little significance. To determine the necessity
of medical certification in light of the present PHS policy, it becomes
essential first to examine the relationship of certification to the overall
system of proof in the exclusion process.
Any alien not clearly entitled to enter the United States may be detained for further inquiry. 114 In a subsequent exclusionary hearing that
alien assumes the burden of proving admissibility. 115 This policy reflects
the position that admission into the United States is a privilege that
an alien must merit} 16 Although this burden falls short of requiring
the alien to introduce clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence 111
that none of the thirty-three exclusionary categories apply, 118 an alien's
admission of facts evincing inadmissibility has been deemed a sufficient basis on which to exclude. 119
To argue that a medical certificate constitutes an indispensable requirement for exclusion, 120 the Ninth Circuit relied on a series of cases
112. These provisions contain the INA's medical exclusions. See supra note 68.
113. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949) (holding a board
of special inquiry bound to accept as final a certificate that an alien is a mental defective where
a medical appeal board has issued such certificate after a fair hearing); United States ex rel.
Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that an alien's inability to rebut findings
in the certificate does not deny due process).
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982). Medical certificates are issued only if immigration officials
clearly establish the presence of a disease or defect. 42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1983); S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1950). If a medical decision must be made where the record is incomplete,
it is the responsibility of the applicant to provide information to rule out the possibility of his
excludability. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 29.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). The government, however, assumes the burden of proof in deportation proceedings. Id.
116. The shift in the burden of proof from the alien to the government is also consistent
with the greater due process safeguards afforded in deportation proceedings. See supra note 47.
111. In re Arthur, 16 I. & N. Dec. 558 (BIA 1978); In re Moore, 13 I. & N. Dec. 711 (BIA
1971). This is the standard of proof required of the government in deportation proceedings.
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
118. These 33 categories are set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982).
119. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner oflmmigration, 273 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1927)
(holding admission of intent to overthrow the government sufficient evidence for purpose of
exclusion).
120. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1983). The Hill court relies on questionable
authority for its contention that a medical certificate is indispensable. That authority, In re Hollinger, 211 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Mich. 1962), asserted that a medical certificate provided the only
evidence upon which a finding of insanity could be made for the purpose of excluding an alien.
This statement, however, represented only one of two alternative bases for the case's holding.
Furthermore, the Hollinger court offered no explanation or support for its comment; it merely
presented the proposition in a conclusory fashion. The district court in Hill, Lesbian/Gay Freedom
Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1982), stated that this conclusion
in Hollinger was the holding of the case. The Fifth Circuit, in In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439,
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that interpret section 236(d) to preclude the introduction of evidence
by the alien to rebut the PHS's certification. 121 If Congress provided
medical examinations for aliens in order to safeguard the opportunity
of these aliens for admission, then the Ninth Circuit's contention would
have merit. In effect, Congress would thereby gratuitously grant aliens
a procedural due process right. If, however, Congress intended medical
examinations to act as nothing more than an expeditious screening procedure, perfor.med for the benefit of the United States in its effort
to exclude undesirable aliens, then section 236(d) might seek only to
accelerate exclusionary proceedings by denying the alien the right to
contest medical evidence brought against him by the PHS.
The available evidence indicates that Congress intended the examination to serve primarily as an expeditious screening procedure. First,
Congress does not seem to have been concerned with establishing procedural protections. The precise language of section 236(d) implies that
medical certification proves dispositive when.available, but it does not
explicitly require such certification. 122 Furthermore, section 236(d) denies
the alien an appe_al of an INS decision based on such certification. 123
Second, because not all incoining aliens receive a full medical examination, it appears that the examination acts primarily as a screening
device. 124 Moreover, the failure of a medical exaininer to find a defect
during the initial examination does not prevent the PHS from later
determining that the alien had been excludable; the INS does not consider the amount of time that has elapsed between the initial entry
and any subsequent determination of _excludability. 125
1444 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983), however, refers to it as dictum. The Ninth Circuit fails to bolster the
reasoning behind Hollinger, maintaining instead only that it finds the case "persuasive." 714 F .2d
1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. 714 F.2d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relies on United States ex rel. Johnson
v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949); United States ex rel. Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d
687, 688 (2d Cir. 1950) (follows Johnson); United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537
(2d Cir. 1960); see supra note 113.
·
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982).
123. Id. An appeal is permitted, however, to seek admission under bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1183 where the defect is physical. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1653-, 1711. An alien also has a right to bring an appeal
of any medical decision before a PHS appeals board. 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982).
124. Medical inspections serve to screen the population from exdudable diseases, bring significant cases to the attention of the INS, and deter medically excludable aliens from entering this
country. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 22, 38, 48; see also.United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy,
277 F.2d 537, 538 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting that the apparent purpose of section 236(d) was to
provide a summary proceeding). Immigrants and five percent of nonimmigrants receive medical
examinations when they apply for visas; all other aliens are subject only to less thorough medical
inspections at their ports of entry. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 9-11, 27.
125. See, e.g., Canciamilla v. Haff, 64 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1933); In re Vallejos, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 68 (BIA 1972); In re LaRochelle, 11 I. & N. Dec. 436, 438 (BIA 1965); In re A-, 8 I. &
N. Dec. 12 (BIA 1958) (medical certificate not required for deportation); accord Santiago v. INS.
526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (validity of visa), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Alarcon-
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2. PHS rule-making authority- Congress divided the authority to
regulate the medical examination of aliens between the PHS and INS;
it charged the PHS with preparing medical regulations and the INS
with prescribing administrative regulations. 126 The PHS exercises plenary
power to evaluate the medical condition of aliens. 121 When medical
certification is available, Congress has denied the INS the authority
to base a medical exclusion on any other criteria. 128 Moreover, Congress explicitly established a procedure for resolving appeals of medical
decisions wholly within the PHS. 129 The medical expertise of the PHS
forms the basis for its autonomy. 130 The INS itself recognized this expertise, noting the authority of the PHS to issue additional instructions and guidelines for performing examinations, 131 and limiting its
own administrative role to establishing procedures for selecting nonPHS physicians to perform medical examinations in places where PHS
officers are not available. 132
3. Validity of the PHS rule- The PHS policy of refusing to certify homosexual aliens as excludable constitutes an administrative rule. 133
Having been informally promulgated, 134 this rule does not have the
Baylon v. Brownell, 250 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1957) (draft evader). See generally Gordon, Finality
of Immigration and Nationality Determinations-Can the Government Be £stopped?, 31 U. Cm.
L. REV. 433 (1964); Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 900 (1977).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982). This division dates back to the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub.
L. No. 64-301, § 15, 39 Stat.' 874, 885. Medical inspection by Marine Hospital Service (forerunner
of the PHS) officers was a part of the 1891 Act. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 38, 26 Stat.
1084, 1085.
127. Congress has taken note of the crucial importance of this medical determination
by prescribing certain minimal procedural requirements that the [PHS] must follow .
. . . · In order that further safeguards might be provided, Congress authorized the Surgeon
General ... to prescribe additional regulations governing the procedure to be observed
in exercise of [the] Service's exclusive authority over medical questions.
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806, 810 (1949) (emphasis added).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982).
129. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982).
130. "Of course practical questions should be determined by the immigration officials, but
questions of purely medical nature must be determined by members of the medical profession."
S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), cited in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Watkins,
170 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1948).
131. 8 C.F.R. § 234.2(a) (1983).
132. 8 C.F.R. § 234.2(b)-(c) (1983). The Ninth Circuit implicitly found that the PHS had
exclusive autp.ority to determine which aliens to exclude for medical reasons. Hill v. INS, 714
F.2d 1470, 1480 (1983). This Note directly examines the authority of the PHS to formulate policy
without relying solely on its role in prov.iding the INS with medical certificates.
133. The term "rule" has a broad meaning. One commentator notes that "[a)II 'rules' could
be lined up on a scale from unthinking habits of a single employee at a low level to the most
formal 'rules' published in the Code of Federal Regulations." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE§ 7:1, at 3 (2d ed. 1979). In this instance, the PHS first issued a memorandum outlining
its new policy, Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398-99, and then incorporated this policy in its Guidelines for Diagnosis of Mental Conditions, the successor to the
PHS MANUAL, supra note 90.
134. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that notice of proposed rule making be given
in the case of substantive or legislative rules. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)).
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force of statutory law. 135 Unlike a statute, the validity of an interpretative
rule is subject to the discretion of the reviewing court and "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade." 136 Courts
ordinarily uphold an agency regulation if the rule is reasonable and
not inconsistent with the statute itself. 137
A close examination of the foundations and operation of the PHS
regulation establishes its validity. The PHS decision to discontinue its
practice of issuing certificates for the purpose of excluding homosexual aliens rested on two bases. First, the policy change reflected "current and generally accepted canons of medical practice with respect
to homosexuality," 138 and second, "the determination of homosexuality
is not made through a medical diagnostic procedure." 139 The
reasonableness of this decision depends upon the authority of the PHS
to change a regulation in accordance with new medical knowledge as
well as the merits of this particular change.
Although Congress never explicitly indicated whether the PHS could
revise its regulations in response to medical advances, the PHS
periodically updated its diagnostic guidelines to conform with current
medical opinion. 140 This ability to revise appears consistent with Congress's implicit intent. In enacting the statutes, Congress repeatedly
sought information regarding current medical knowledge to help formulate its legislation. 141 Congress relied exclusively on the PHS to pro-

135. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7:8, at 36-43 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982).
136. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
137. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
381 (1969) (holding that, with regard to an FCC regulation, the "venerable principle that the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong"); Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
375, 378 (193 I) (holding that a tax regulation made "pursuant to express authority" was "valid
unless unreasonable or inconsistent with statute").
138. Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398.
139. Id. at 399.
140. The PHS issued Guidelines for the Diagnosis of Mental Conditions in 1973 and 1981
to update its PHS MANUAL, supra note 90. The diagnosis of narcotic drug addiction
provides an example of the revisions the PHS made. The Manual merely stated that "(a) narcotic drug addict is any person who habitually uses any habit-forming narcotic drugs so as to
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or ... [has] lost the power of self-control with the drug." Id. at 6-7. The 1973 revision requires "evidence of habitual use and (a]
clear ... need for the drug in order to continue the normal level of functioning" to substantiate
this diagnosis and suggests the use of the Nalline test. AMERICAN PsYCIDATRIC AssOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as DSM-Ill], is relied on in the 1981 guidelines. Evidence of tolerance to the drug and symptoms
of withdrawal are necessary to support a diagnosis of this condition.
141. Rep. Walter, sponsor of the 19S2 McCarran-Walter Act, asked the Pl:IS for comments
on the bill's medical aspects. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 19S2 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699. In hearings pursuant to a.House Study, Rep. Poff asked
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vide this information, which it invariably incorporated into the bill
under consideration. 1 ' 2 Knowing that medical knowledge does not
stagnate between enactments of legislation, Congress's explicit allocation to the PHS of the authority to prepare medical regulations 1 ' 3 seems
to provide the agency with the power to revise its policy in light of
medical advances, if not to require it to do so. The alternative, to compel
practicing physicians to retain obsolete medical standards, seems absurd in comparison. 1 ' '
The reasonableness of the PHS policy change should be examined
in light of the medical authority supporting it. The initial removal of
homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association's (APA)
Diagnostic and Statistical Manua/ 1' 5 aroused vehement debate within
the psychiatric community, 146 factions of which still contest the
change. 147 The PHS did not, however, alter its policy during this tura PHS physician if and how § 212(a)(4) of the INA should be amended so as to be certain
of excluding homosexual aliens and "sex perverts." PHS STUDY,_ supra note 85, at 15.
142. Although Congress may not have understood what the PHS was saying, see supra text
accompanying notes 76-89, it believed it was following PHS advice when it dropped the terms
"homosexuals and sex perverts" from its immigration bill. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699, 1702. It also adopted
the suggestion of PHS physician Dr. Jacobs, PHS STUDY, supra note 84, at 15, that "ss:xual
deviation" would comprise "homosexuality" and "sexual perversion." S. REP. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 3337.
143. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982).
144. Justice Cardozo laments that statutory construction is "often a choice between uncertainties. We must be content to choose the lesser." Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288
(1933). "To arrive at a decision, we have therefore to put to ourselves the question, which choice
is it the more likely that Congress would have made?" Id. at 285. If the PHS had told Congress
that homosexuality is not a psychiatric disorder and that physicians have no expertise in diagnosing it, two outcomes seem plausible. First, Congress might have listed homosexuality as a moral
exclusion, or, second, Congress might have tried to exclude on medical grounds sexually perverted
or deviant persons, but not homosexual aliens. It seems unlikely that Congress would have told
the PHS that, as a matter of legislative fact, homosexuality was a disease and the PHS must
diagnose it as such.
145. DSM-II, supra note 7.
146. See Green, Homosexuality as a Mental Illness, l OINT'L. J. PSYCHIATRY 77 ( 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Green, Homosexuality]; Bell, Critical Evaluation: Human Sexuality-A Response, 10
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 99 (1972); Hatteret, Critical Evaluation: A Critique, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY
103 (1972); Hoffman, Critical Evaluation: Philosophic, Empirical, and Ecological Remarks, IO
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 105 (1972); Karlen, Critical Evaluation: A Discussion of "Homosexuality
as a Mental Illness," IO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 108 (1972); Marmor, Critical Evaluation:
Homosexuality-Mental Illness or Moral Dilemma?, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 114 (1972); Socarides,
Critical Evaluation: Homosexuality-Basic Concepts and Pschodynamics, IO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY
118 (1972); Green, Author's Reply, lO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 126 (1972); see also Should Homosexuality Be in the APA Nomenclature?, supra note 7.
147. A leading critic of the APA's position cites a 1977 study in which 680Jo of 10,000
psychiatrists who were asked "Is homosexuality usually a pathological adaptation (as opposed
to a normal variation)?" responded in the affirmative. Socarides, The Sexual Deviations and
the Diagnostic Manual, 32 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 414, 424-25 (1978); see also Gnepp, Biology,
Mental 1//ness and Homosexuality: A Comment on Public Affairs, 12 PsYCHOLOOY 60 (1975).
For an enunciation of the APA's current position, see Bayer & Spitzer, Edited Correspondence
on the Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III, 18 J. HIST. BEHAVIORAL Sc1. 32 (1982); Spitzer,
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bulent period. Instead it waited until a new edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manua/ 148 affirmed the revision. Furthermore, the PHS
listed other health organizations that had endorsed the AP A's
position. 149 Although unanimity among psychiatrists may not exist with
regard to the classification of homosexuality, given the medical
expertise 150 of the PHS and the existence of significant support for
the reclassification of homosexuality, the PHS rule incorporating this
new policy seems reasonable. 151
Although the PHS policy may be reasonable, to acquire the force
of law it must also comply with the congressional intent 152 underlying
the statutory exclusion of aliens afflicted with "psychopathic personality" or "sexual deviation." To understand the relationship between
the PHS rule and congressional intent, it is necessary to examine the
nature of the PHS policy change in light of that intent. The AP A
reevaluation of homosexuality has aspects of both scient.ific inquiry 153
Commentary-The Diagnostic Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformulation of the
Issues, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 210 (1981).
148. DSM-III, supra note 140.
149. These organizations include the American Psychological Associaton, the American Public
Health Association, the American Nurses' Association, and the Council of Advanced Practitioners in Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of the American Nurses' Association. Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398.
ISO. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
151. The PHS also based its policy change on the determination that homosexuality was
not a medical diagnosis. The INS relies on this to conclude that it has authority to make a
determination of homosexuality. In re Hill, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2873, at 5-8 (July 9, 1981).
Given the difficulty of establishing a diagnosis of homosexu_ality, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-41, 343-44 (1950); PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701, one could argue that after
more than 20 years of excluding homosexual aliens, see supra note 42, the PHS had, independently
of the the APA's change in position, decided that the diagnosis of homosexuality was too difficult to make. It might even be argued that the PHS used the AP A change as an excuse to
justify the elimination of an exclusion it had never liked. The diagnosis of homosexuality, in
the absence of reliable objective tests, see supra note 79, however, seems no more problematic
than a determination of a history of insanity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1982). Both involve a subjective evaluation of an alien's response to questions. This similarity reduces the likelihood that
the PHS found the diagnosis of homosexuality, but not a past history of insanity, nonmedical.
The absence of any evidence that the PHS has acted in bad faith further weakens the cynic's
argument. Thus, the contention that the PHS determination that homosexuality was not a medical
diagnosis depended upon the APA's change in position appears more plausible than the INS
view of diagnosability implicit in /n re Hill.
152. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (noting that courts need not
defer to an agency's rule if it is inconsistent with obvious congressional intent or there are compelling indications that the rule is wrong); cf. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
342, 349 (1920) (holding that an agency's administrative rule has the force of law unless it conflicts with an express statutory provision).
153. A set of studies examining the prevalence of psychopathology in homosexual men and
women released three years before the APA nomenclature revealed only slight differences in
occurrences of these psychopathologies in homosexual and heterosexual persons. Saghir, Robins,
Walbran, and Gentry, Homosexuality: Ill. Psychiatric Disorder and Disability in the Male
Homosexual, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1079 (1970); Saghir, Robins, Walbran, and Gentry, Homosexuality. IV. Psychiatric Disorders and Disability in the Female Homosexual, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
147 (1970).
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and moral judgment. 1 54 The consistency of the PHS policy with congressional intent depends upon the relationship between these two aspects
of that reevaluation.
The AP A reclassification may be read to assert that homosexuality
is not a disorder itself, but merely a condition abnormal in a statistical
sense. 155 This approach maintains that, because inquiry into a person's
sexual orientation had almost exclusively accompanied a finding of mental disorder, the psychiatric profession erroneously assumed that
homosexuality must itself be a disorder. 156 Upon closer examination,
however, psychiatrists discovered that not all homosexuals possessed
these other disorders. 157 In light of their medical expertise, they decided
that homosexuality per se did not constitute a disorder. 158 This conclusion may involve a moral judgment, but it is a moral judgment the
medical community has always been allowed to make. 159 Society
delegates it the authority to determine whether a particular set of
behaviors or a certain physical characteristic warrants the epithet
"disease." Society assumes that the moral standards of the medical
profession sufficiently resemble those of the community as a whole
to permit that profession to determine, for example, that alcoholism

154. A participant in the APA classification debate published an article three years before the
APA took up the issue of the psychiatric status of homosexuality. The author contends that
homosexuality is a medical disorder that has reached epidemiological proportions and that remains subject to wide social condemnation. The study observes that "(p]olls have shown that
the majority of the public still favors legal punishment for homosexual acts even if performed
in private," and that "homosexuality is considered more harmful to society than adultery and
even abortion with its actual threat to life." Socarides, Homosexuality and Medicine, 212 J.
A.M.A. 1199 (1970).
155. Some support exists for the proposition that homosexuality is not even statistically abnormal. See Green, Homosexuality, supra note 146, at 85-87.
156. Homosexuality probably has a tendency to go unseen in persons without other psychiatric
disorders and to appear in those manifesting these other disorders. A medical examination offers
only a brief inquiry into the alien's sexual preference. In addition, privacy and fear of- social
censure would keep aliens from volunteering this information.
157. See supra note 153.
158. Although the PHS never states that this analysis represents its interpretation of the APA
decision, this analysis is, nonetheless, most consistent with the scientific method. The alternative
hypothesis is that the AP A simply made the moral judgment that homosexuality is not immoral.
Whether this is what the APA did may not be as important as what the PHS thought the APA
did. If the PHS was knowingly adopting the moral fiat of the APA, then it arguably was operating
outside the scope of its medical authority. Absent contrary evidence, however, it should be presumed, in deference to the medical expertise of the PHS, that the service was relying on the
scientific, medical analysis outlined in the text.
·
159. Green, Homosexuality, supra note 146, at 78 (arguing that psychiatrists usually are granted
the prerogative of determining what behaviors to diagnose as mental illness, and that through
mere consensus, they so designated homosexuality) (quoting M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD:
MALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CREATION OF EVIL (1968)). This argument allows for the
possibility that homosexuality could again be deemed an illness if new scientific evidence emerged
which changes its relationship with other mental disorders or the medical community changed
its moral outlook.
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but not cigarette smoking requires psychiatric treatment. Of course the
profession's conclusion that some forms of behavior, such as prostitution, do not constitute a disease does not preclude society from deeming them immoral, but only indicates that the characteristic or behavior
stands outside the expertise of the medical profession. 160
This line of reasoning suggests that the PHS rule complies with congressional intent. Congress's continuing association of homosexuality
with sexual perversion and sexual deviation 161 provides a basis for the
contention that Congress was doing no more than expressing the thencurrent medical opinion that homosexuality always signified the presence
of one of these other psychiatric disorders. Accordingly, Congress would
have wanted homosexuality dropped as an exclusionary condition when
the psychiatric community established that homosexuality did not
necessarily constitute evidence of a medically recognized disorder.
C.

Effect of the Rule on the INS

The INS disagreed with the policy the PHS adopted regarding the
exclusion of homosexual aliens. 162 Under the INS interpretation of the
INA, the PHS possesses the power to "promulgate policies regarding
the description and diagnosis of disease," 163 except in cases in which
Congress has already defined the term. 164 With regard to diagnosability, the INS concedes that the legislature may not alter a determination by the Surgeon General that a particular disease is not medically
diagnosable.. The INS asserts, however, that it cannot evaluate the
diagnosability of homosexuality. 16 ' The INS concludes that, despite the
160. One could argue that the determination of whether to classify a behavior as a mental
disorder turns on whether the conduct injures someone other than the actor. This analysis suggests that alcoholism is psychiatrically treated because of auto accidents caused by drunk
drivers. Similarly, cigarette smoking is not deemed a disease, since it generally injures only the
actor. This line of reasoning, however, does not account for the treatment of a great many neuroses,
despite the fact that neurotic persons can be very pleasant and may exhibit no peculiar propensity for harming others.
161. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 212(a)(7) (1950), the first version of the INA, included
homosexuals and sex perverts in the same section. The report accompanying the bill emphasizes
the connection, saying "the classes of mentally defectives should be enlarged to include homosexuals
and other sex perverts." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950). When Congress eliminated
the explicit exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts it noted that the change did not modify
its "intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1952). This language was reiterated in the report accompanying the 1965 Amendment.
S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 196S U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328,
3337; see also PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 14-15.
162. See Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9; Press Release, supra note 9.
163. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 574.
164. Id. The INS contends that Congress's classification of homosexuality as a disease
represented a definition of that term and that the PHS lacked the authority to redefine it.
165. Id. at 577 n.5.
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PHS policy, homosexual aliens remain subject to exclusion, and that
an admission of homosexuality 166 suffices to warrant exclusion. 167
This view contains two serious flaws. First, the INS concession that
Congress cannot alter medical facts, including the diagnosability of
a particular disease, may conflict with the contention that a congressional definition of a disease cannot be revised. For example, Congress might charge the PHS with certifying as excludable those alie!JS
afflicted with contagious diseases of the scalp, and the legislative history
of this Act. might enumerate psoriasis as one such disease. Since the
PHS knows, as a matter of medical fact, that psoriasis is not contagious, this congressional definition of a disease could have no medical
significance. More to the point, if Congress had relied on the erroneous
advice of the PHS in formulating "its exclusion of persons with contagious psoriasis, this "affliction" would not remain in any useful sense
a disease after the PHS discovered its error. 168 Moreover, a person
who still thought his psoriasis was contagious; and disclosed this condition to the INS, would not merit exclusion.
Although the APA reevaluation of homosexuality does not rest on
as clear a factual error as does the above example, 169 . the illustration
indicates that reliance on medical experts for the determination of
medical facts may have an impact on the evaluation of a congressional
medical definition. The unyielding position of the INS fails to accommodate the possibility of a medical advance rendering a definition in
a statute or legislative history erroneous.
Second, the INS inappropriately minimizes the role the PHS played
in the initial definition of the mental disorders. Congress relied on the
PHS to provide information regarding the definitions of "psychopathic
personality" and "sexual deviation." 110 Instead of stating that Congress defined these terms, it would be more accurate to assert that the
166. This policy, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, conflicts with the INS's previous
administrative practice of requiring.a medical examination and certificate for exclusion on medical
grounds. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1477 n.9 (9th Cir. 1983).
167. Press Release, supra note 9, at 441.
168. The INS recognized the changing interpretation of homosexuality, saying "[i]t may
reasonably be inferred that Congress intended homosexuality to be defined in light of current
knowledge and social mores." Memorandum of Attorney General, supra note 9, at 581. This
assertion seems to provide support for the PHS policy change. The INS contends that PHS
may alter the definitions of diseases and that Congress intended the definition of homosexuality
to be revised, but that the PHS revision of homosexuality is unauthorized. The INS may be
objecting to the extent of the PHS revision, a revision which resembles an abolition rather than
an alteration. If, however, the factors of "current knowledge" and "social mores" warrant such
a drastic redefinition it is difficult to see what, in the view of the INS, precludes it.
169. The contagious psoriasis argument does not reflect the nature of the APA reevaluation
of homosexuality. Although factual evidence contesting the classification of homosexuality as
a disease was involved in this reevaluation, see supra note 153, there were some moral considerations as well; see supra notes 154 & 160; text accompanying notes 159-60.
170. See supra notes 141-42.
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PHS defined them and that Congress adopted those definitions, giving the PHS explicit authority to prepare subsequent regulations. It
seems somewhat inconsistent that the INS infers that it is authorized
to "promulgate definitions and implement policies that reflect contemporary assessments of 'immoral purpose' and 'moral turpitude'''
because Congress did not define these terms, yet maintains that when
Congress included homosexuality within the term "psychopathic personality" in explicit reliance on PHS medical advice, it intended to
preclude the PHS from redefining that term in light of new medical
knowledge. 111
Because of the inconsistencies of the INS position, the PHS policy
represents a preferable interpretation of section 212(a)(4) of the INA.
Although the INS bears the responsibility for excluding aliens under
that section, the medical determination of the PHS that homosexuality is not a mental disorder renders the alien's admission of homosexuality irrelevant to the issue of exclusion.
IV.

CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The current disagreement regarding the PHS role in the exclusion
process may have no appreciable impact on this country's exclusion
and deportation practices. The present INS criterion for excluding
homosexual aliens requires that the alien make an unsolicited, unambiguous disclosure of his or her homosexuality. 112 Consequently, this
policy allows homosexual aliens to enter the United States at will without
having to make any misrepresentations concerning their sexual
orientation. 113 Although the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the INA
171. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 576 n.4. The INS contention
that the PHS cannot ignore the congressional definition of a disease has merit, and the INS
cites cases which stand for the proposition that agencies cannot make rules which are inharmonious with congressional intent, Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129,
134 (1936), or congressional purpose, United States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 & n.12 (1977).
Memorandum of Attorney General, supra note 9, at 574. Although Congress arguably gave
"specific meaning," id., to "psychopathic personality" by including homosexuality within it,
it failed to offer a clear definition of homosexuality. Thus, the PHS has not contravened congressional purpose by redefining that term. In fact, the organization's expertise peculiarly qualifies
it to make such determinations.
172. See Press Release, supra note 9, at 441. The INS guidelines also provided for the exclusion of aliens who are identified by a fellow alien as a homosexual, id., but the likelihood of
such an occurrence is remote, In re Hill, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2873, at 6 (July 9, 1982).
173. Hill v. INS did not arise from standard procedures, but was essentially a test case. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 571 (1982), modified sub nom.
Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d
405, 406 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that defendant's failure to mention in his sworn visa application
a conviction for soliciting other males was material to the issue of his admissibility since such
an offense constituted a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of an exclusionary
provision); Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per curiam,
278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960).
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would make all homosexual aliens subject to deportation, 174 it seems
unlikely that the INS would undertake such an operation. 11 s
The conflicting circuit court views, however, are of consequence to
the naturalization process. 176 One requirement of naturalization is the
alien's lawful admission to the country. 111 Unlike deportation proceedings, which the INS initiates, the petitioner begins the naturalization process 178 and bears the burden of proving eligibility for
citizenship. 179 The INS could not overlook the alien's homosexuality
in this process, and the alien's failure to disclose or denial of his or
her homosexuality would constitute misrepresentation. 180
Congressional action would provide the most definitive resolution
of this controversy. A number of bills have been introduced which
would settle this issue by eliminating section 212(a)(4) of the INA
entirely. 181 None of these bills, however, have come close to passing.
Nevertheless, such legislation still has support - the Justice
Department, 182 the ~arter White House, 183 and at least one group of
174. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861 (May
29, 1984). The court seems to assume the continuing excludability of homosexuals and seeks
only to determine what evidence will support such an exclusion. Consequently, the question of
deportability would be a matter of introducing sufficient evidence that the alien had been a
homosexual before entry. The nature of this evidence remains unclear, because medical diagnosis
is disputed. If an admission of homosexuality provides a sufficient basis for exclusion, then little
may be required to fulfill the government's burden of proof in deportation proceedings.
175. The guidelines established for excluding homosexual aliens do not represent a rigorous
policy of denying admission to all homosexual aliens. Since the Attorney General has discretion
whether to deport and cannot be compelled to deport, United States ex rel. Masucci v. Follette,
272 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the laxity in enforcing the exclusion provisions would probably be reflected in deportation as well.
176. See Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981) (homosexuality found not to be inconsistent with naturalization requirement of good moral character); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp 1208
(D. Or. 1975); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Contra In re Schmidt, 56 Misc.
2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (alien's homosexual practices were inconsistent with
good moral character).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982).
179. 8 u.s.c. § 1429 (1982).
180. Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630, 637-38 (1967) (holding that alien's false denial
of association with the Communist Party constituted evidence that alien lacked good moral
character); Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973) (evidence that alien had given
false testimony concerning homosexual proclivities sustained denial of petition).
181. S. 1086, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Sen. Cranston); H.R. 3524, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Reps. Dixon (Cal.), Beilenson, Waxman, Frank, Weiss,
Barnes, Bingham, Burton (J.L. Cal.), Burton (P. Cal.), Chisholm, Conyers, Delloms, Fauntroy,
Fazio, Garcia, Green, Lowry, McKinney, Mikulski, Mitchell (Md.), Ottinger, Richmond, Sabo,
Stark and Studds); S. 2210, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by Sen. Cranston); H.R.
6303, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by Reps. Beilenson, Dixon and Waxman); cf.
H.R. 2815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Rep. Dixon).
182. "The Justice Department [suppo'rts) legislation which would eliminate homosexuality
as a ground for exclusion." Press Release, supra note 9, at 442.
183. See L.A. Daily J., White House Backs Letting Homosexual Aliens into U.S., June 27,
1980, at 3, col. 6.
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congressional representatives 184 have endorsed a policy of admitting
homosexual aliens. 185
CONCLUSION

The fate of homosexual aliens wishing to enter, reside in, or become
citizens of, the United States remains unsettled. The resolution of this
conflict depends upon a determination of the PHS role in the exclusionary process. The INA's legislative history provides ample evidence
of Congress's consistent reliance on PHS expertise in formulating and
amending the Act's medical exclusions. This reliance suggests that Congress intended the PHS to revise the definitions of medical terms so
they would conform with changing medical knowledge. Despite its moral
overtones, homosexuality represents one such medical term for the purposes of the INA. Thus, the PHS reevaluation of this term, in response
to a change by the psychiatric profession, conforms with congressional
intent. The INS, therefore, should not continue to ignore Congress's
deference to the PHS's medical expertise. Instead, it should acknowledge
the authority of the PHS by complying with the decision to discon. tinue the practice of excluding aliens on the basis of their homosexuality.

-Robert Poznanski

184. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 576 n.4.
185. If Congress fails to act, the Supreme Court, of course, has the authority to decide the
issue pursuant to its jursidiction over circuit court conflicts involving a federal question. 28 U .S.C.
§ IJ54 (1976); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); United States v.
Zucca, 351 U.S. 91 (1956); United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956).

